This article considers the impact of sub-national political systems on economic growth by applying the case of Russian regions from 2000 to 2004. It investigates two dimensions of the sub-national systems. First, it studies the influence of democracy on economic performance, providing evidence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth. Regions with high levels of democracy, as well as strong autocracies, perform better than hybrid regimes. Second, this article considers the influence of the size of the bureaucracy on economic outcomes and confirms the "grabbing hand" view on bureaucracy rather than the Weberian idea. Increasing the size of the bureaucracy is associated with a decline in economic performance. In addition, this article analyzes the potential interaction between these two characteristics of sub-national politics as factors of economic growth, but does not establish any robust results.
Introduction
This article considers the impact of sub-national political regimes on regional economic performance. Studying sub-national variations of political systems in this context can be important from three perspectives (see also Snyder 2001) . First, for individual countries, one often obtains more compatible data (for example, collected A. Libman (B) Frankfurt School of Finance & Managements, Frankfurt, Germany e-mail: alibman@yandex.ru by a single federal statistical agency), thus mitigating the comparability, measurement error and self-selection problems that exist in international samples. Furthermore, one reduces the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, because the differences between regions are usually smaller than between countries. Second, one of the key problems of the growth econometrics is the direction of causation associated with the search for appropriate instruments. In an intra-national comparison study, it is possible to use the country specifics to search for the identification strategies. Hence, the insight from the sub-national variations in political regimes can be used to test the general predictions regarding the impact of political regimes on economic development. Third, the sub-national political variation, as such, is also important from the development perspective.
Specifically, the article discusses two characteristics of sub-national politics, which receive substantial attention in the political economics and development economics: regional level of democracy and regional structure of the public administration (Ahrens 2006) . As for the first aspect, the extensive literature on the impact of political regimes on economic growth primarily explores the international variations of democracy. However, levels of democracy vary not only internationally, but also within individual countries (especially federations). Regional differentiations in democracy are quite common in developing and transition countries. This trend has been observed all over the world; examples, as discussed in the literature, include Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and India. Sub-national authoritarianism has existed in the past in some developed countries as well, particularly in the United States (Gibson 2005; McMann 2006; Beer and Mitchell 2006; Gel'man 2008; Gervasoni 2010) . However, although the existence of the sub-national variation of democracy seems to be a relatively well-established fact, there is very little known about the impact of this variation on economic performance.
At the international level, one can easily use the standard quantitative measures of democracy (which are often disputed, but still regularly applied in the quantitative analysis). At the sub-national level, however, the information on the variations of democracy has been mostly anecdotal. In addition, many federations include a relatively small number of regions; therefore, econometric analysis could also become problematic. This article overcomes these problems by studying the impact of the sub-national political regimes on sub-national economic growth in the Russian Federation. First, the Russian Federation consists of a large number of regions, thus making statistical analysis technically possible. Second, and more importantly, the variations in the levels of democracy across Russian regions seem to be enormous, and there is quantitative information that can be used to characterize these regimes. Third, there is also a significant variation in the economic performance of the Russian regions. Hence, in this the article, I use the Russian Federation as an empirical framework for studying the traditional "democracy-and-growth" nexus using sub-national data (and thus potentially expanding our knowledge on how democracies influence growth in general) and for understanding whether sub-national variations in political regimes (i.e., democracy level) contribute to the variations in economic growth within a particular country.
As for the second dimension of sub-national political systems-the public administration, this article discusses a particular aspect, which has almost never been studied
